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THE PROMISE OF EQUALITY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES OF EQUALITY IN
INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES
Nicole Lillibridge*
INTRODUCTION
All men are not created equal. This assertion seems wrong, even immoral, as
modem liberal thought has established the inherent, equal worth of every person.
But true equality among people cannot be achieved because there are natural
inequalities among us. We recognize that one individual may have greater innate
literary or athletic talent than another, or superior beauty or strength. These talents,
in a just society, should be rewarded even though they have no moral significance.
Therefore, some measure of discrimination among people is legitimate, and even
mandated under a conception of a just society.' The difficulty in establishing and
furthering such a meritocratic society, however, arises from the pernicious effects
of longstanding illegitimate and immoral bases for discriminating among people,
such as gender, race, and class. Over time, these differences compound, so that the
child born into a relatively privileged family often gains certain advantages without
any demonstration of superior talent, ability, or moral worthiness.2
This Article explores the differing conceptions of equality in the very different
constitutional systems of India and the United States. The respective histories and
predominant religions in each country have shaped divergent views concerning
equality. India's long and complex history of entrenched social hierarchy has led
its people to view the concept of equality as rather collective; in particular, the idea
* The author is a 2004 graduate of the College of William & Mary School of Law. She
is in private practice in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. She would like to extend special thanks
to Professor Christie Warren for her comments and advice on this article.
1 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (197 1), reprinted in GEORGE C. CHRISTIE &
PATRICK H. MARTIN, JURISPRUDENCE: TEXT AND READINGS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
322 (2d ed. 1995) ("The natural distribution [of innate abilities and the chance of social
circumstance] is neither just nor unjust; nor is it unjust that some men are born into society
at some particular position. What is just and unjust is the way that institutions deal with these
facts.")
2 The morally arbitrary foundations of distinctions among such groups form one kind
of argument against class inequalities. This could be considered a critique of class inequality
at its foundations, as opposed to a present-time conception of the injustice of class inequality,
which would focus on the disparity between a small class of extreme affluence and a large
class of people with little to no wealth or resources.
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of perfect equality, for many Indians, would chiefly include elimination of caste
barriers and inferiority. In the United States, historical and religious influences
resulted in, and perpetuate, a view focused on equality of individuals. This view
has been described as "equality of opportunity," or as embodying an "anti-
discrimination principle."3
Every aspect of national expression reflects the self-identification of the people
in a nation as predominantly individualist or collectivist - whether in the areas of
economic policy, foreign affairs, trade, or human rights. This Article primarily
focuses on the issue of class equality, although that focus will hardly prove
distinct. In India, an examination of class inequality must inevitably focus on
caste inequality, yet elements of racial inequality and gender inequality will cer-
tainly intersect. Similarly, in the United States, while the concerns of the poor and
of blacks are not fully aligned, black Americans are disproportionately poor.
Moreover, the American paradigm of individual rights finds its strongest expression
in the politics of economic disparity.
National identification with either of these paradigmatic worldviews -
individualist or collective - and the resulting conception of equality as it existed
at the time of constitution drafting, find embodiment in the documents themselves.
In addition, I would argue that those constitutional imperatives subsequently mold
and shape a national ideology of equality. In particular, India's hierarchical social
order and the historical degradation of certain groups led to compensatory dis-
crimination programs in its constitution. Subsequently, the constitution shaped the
view of social organization, with upper-caste groups now perceiving themselves as
disadvantaged. Established after independence, the Constitution of India reflects the
assumption that Indian society represents inequality, and the provisions regarding
compensatory discrimination programs propose reforms toward that goal, with an
ultimate aim of ameliorating unequal effects.
Americans' belief that their nation is essentially classless has led to a
Constitution uniquely focused on individual rights. An examination of the 14th
Amendment as representative of a color-blind approach toward remedying in-
equalities reveals how the assumption that the United States is a nation of equals has
been used to hamper reforms, in particular by disregarding the apparent effects of
societal inequality and focusing instead on the implementation of a formalistic
antidiscrimination principle. This view allows the effects of real inequality to be
dismissed, at least in part, as representing the natural distribution of innate talents
and abilities of each individual, rather than viewing existing equality as a product
of unequal societal treatment over time.
' See John Hasnas, Equal Opportunity, Affirmative Action, and the Anti-Discrimination
Principle: The Philosophical Basis for the Legal Prohibition ofDiscrimination, 71 FORDHAM
L. REV. 423, 429-41 (2002).
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This Article first explores the consciousness of equality in India. Part I
discusses the historical and religious roots of India and the influence of colonization.
The Hindu caste system is addressed in Section A, while Section B details the role
of colonialism in India's history. India's modem constitutional representations of
equality are explored in Part II, including the Indian Supreme Court's role in
furthering these constitutional aims. Part III of this Article focuses on the United
States's individualistic approach to equality. Particular religious and philosophical
influences on the framing of the Constitution are addressed in Section A. The
conception of equality expressed in the !Constitution itself, including subsequent
amendments and U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence, is the focus of Section B. A
comparative analysis of these systems, provided in the Conclusion of this Article,
demonstrates that a state's view toward equal rights impacts its ability to move
toward greater economic and social equality and fulfill the mandates of its foun-
dational documents. The Conclusion further discusses recommendations for greater
progress in all systems striving for a better model of equality and, ultimately, more
just societies.
I. INDIA'S HISTORICAL AND RELIGIOUS ROOTS
While the caste system and its origins in Hinduism provide the central focus of
this examination of India's view of equality and social reform, it would be
dismissive and oversimplified to treat the system itself as disconnected from a
greater system of belief. Moreover, India's religious history and social history are
closely related. As one of the world's oldest civilizations, the entire Indian sub-
continent weathered many social changes and was exposed to the influences of
several religions and cultures.4 For centuries, it has been a place of very diverse
religious and ethnic groups, yet Hinduism has remained the dominant religion
despite the encroachment by outside religions,5 such as by Christian missionaries,
who have been active for many centuries.6 Internal religious movements, such as
Buddhism, Jainism, and Sikhism emerged as strong religious influences but did not
threaten the strength of Hindu belief to a serious degree.'
Hinduism has been described as an "experience" or an "attitude of mind," rather
than a doctrinal code.' Astounding varieties of spiritual belief are encompassed
under the overarching label, including polytheism, pantheism, monotheism, as well
' See A.L. Basham, Introduction to A CULTURAL HISTORY OF INDIA 1, 1-4 (A. L.
Basham ed., 1975).
' See A.L. Basham, Conclusion to A CULTURAL HISTORY OF INDIA, supra note 4, at
487, 494.
6 S. Radhakrishnan, Hinduism, in A CULTURAL HISTORY OF INDIA, supra note 4, at
60, 62.
7id.
8 Id. at 63.
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as ancestor-worship or idolatry.9 Such diversity can be explained, in part, by the
emphasis the Hindu tradition places on tolerance of other views" and the encour-
agement of discussing reform."
A. The Hindu Caste System
Central to Hindu belief are the ideas of samsara, the nearly unending circle from
death to rebirth, and karma, the law of moral cause and effect. As Radhakrishnan
explains, "The Hindu social code does not ask us to impose an unnatural order on the
world. We discover the intentions of nature in the constitution of men and women
and it is our duty to act agreeably on them."'" Radhakrishnan seems to refer to the
system of the varnas, or the caste system, which has its roots in Hindu cosmology.
Dharma provides the central theme of the Hindu sastras, or ancient texts. While
dharma can have various meanings, it basically refers to duties or codes of conduct
mandated by the cosmic order. The moral prescription of dharma focuses on two
aspects of human life: life stages 3 and class. 4 Dharma dictates varying duties for
people depending on their position in society. According to the creation story of
Hinduism, the primordial body of Brahma (or God or Vishnu, depending on the sect
of Hinduism) created the world by dividing his body into four sections.15 Each
section represented a varna, or caste, into which people would be divided. The
priests (Brahmans) were at the top of the hierarchical order, followed by the warriors
9 Id. at 67.
Id. at 70. Radhakrishnan wrote:
A religion that is based on the central truth of a comprehensive
universal spirit cannot support an inflexible dogmatism. It adopts an
attitude of toleration not as a matter of policy or expediency but as a
principle of spiritual life. Toleration is a duty, not a mere concession.
In pursuance of this duty Hinduism has accepted within its fold almost
all varieties of belief and doctrine and treated them as authentic
expressions of the spiritual endeavor, however antithetic they may
appear to be. Hinduism warns us that each of us should be modest
enough to realize that we may perhaps be mistaken in our views and
what others hold with equal sincerity is not a matter for ridicule.
Id.
Id. at 71 ("Trying to impose one's opinions on others is neither so exciting nor so
fruitful as joining hands in an endeavour to attain a result much larger than we know.").
12 Id. at 75.
3 The obligations of a person depended on his life stages, which progressed from "active
participation in the affairs of the world to a life of retirement and contemplation." STEPHEN
A. TYLER, INDIA: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 77 (1973).
14 Id.
15 NICHOLAS B. DIRKS, CASTES OF MIND: COLONIALISM AND THE MAKING OF MODERN
INDIA 19 (2001).
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(Ksatriyas), the merchants (Vaisyas), and finally the laborers or servants (Sudras). 6
Each of these groups held different societal obligations and each of these divisions
came to be known by occupational functions, 7 which also reflect the caste
hierarchy's underlying obsession with purity. The preoccupation with the idea of
purity is based on the central belief of maintaining order in carrying out the
sacrificial ritual.'8 Tyler describes the role of the ritual in Hindu society as integral.
Indian thought has allowed only two opposed possibilities: the
correspondence between cosmic order and human experience is
mediated through the social order, or it is expressed directly as
a relation between the individual and the cosmos. This oppo-
sition has far-reaching consequences. If the correspondence is
mediated through the social order, then the individual is not a
datum of society, but if the correspondence is between the
individual and the cosmos, then society is not a datum of
individual experience. Indian thought thus establishes two
mutual exclusive categories: the individual is either totally
subject to society, or he is totally free of it. There is no middle
way ....
Axiomatic in Indian thought is the notion that ritual is the
connection between the cosmos and the social order. To
perform a rite correctly is to participate directly in the cosmic
process."
This explanation of the ritual process demonstrates another differentiation among
the castes. The priests perform the rite, the warriors commission it, and the mer-
chants provide the requisite goods and services to carry it out.20 As the Shudras may
6 Id. Despite wide recognition of the Brahmans as the superior caste, there have been
claims to this privilege by the Ksatriyas, which are supported by ambiguities in the creation
accounts. TYLER, supra note 13, at 81. Moreover, the merchant class is perceived to be far
below the Ksatriyas, although their historical success in business has led them to marked
economic success in some instances despite their clearly inferior status in the social
hierarchy. Id.
"7 The occupational associations may have been imposed subsequent to the original
creation myth by theologians (i.e., Brahmans). TYLER, supra note 13, at 23. The difficulties
this uncertainty poses for historical study are addressed infra Part I.B.
Is DmKS, supra note 15, at 57.
19 TYLER, supra note 13, at 24 (citation omitted).
20 DIRKS, supra note 15, at 20-21.
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not participate at all, their role in the order is to facilitate the ability of the other
groups to continue the ritual, by acting as their servants.2
Tyler elaborates on the other category of Indian thought - individualism:
In contrast to this necessarily hierarchic structure of society
is the maximal freedom and egalitarianism entailed by the view
that the individual is the locus of the correspondence between
macrocosm and microcosm. Just as the very notion of society
implies hierarchy, the notion of free individual implies total
egalitarianism. Where there are only free individuals there is no
society. Consequently, the notion of freedom in India has
always had an extra mundane reference and has always involved
a denigration of ritual .... [This view no doubt] represents an
archaic mythological opposition between man in society and
man in a state of nature .... The origin of society entails the
death of freedom and the subjugation of the individual.22
The social hierarchy of the caste system can be envisioned, therefore, as inextricable
from the essential practice of Hinduism itself.
Indian society cannot be cleanly divided into four castes, nor do these castes
adequately categorize all of Hindu society. First, the creation legend does not
account for the "outcastes" or "untouchables," who identify themselves as the
"Dalit" classes.23 While the origin of these people in the creation story is disputed,
21 ld. at 21.
22 TYLER, supra note 13, at 24-25 (citation omitted).
"3 There are various ways in which to refer to this group today, in large part due to greater
caste consciousness arising from the reforms of the twentieth century. Briefly, the
constitution outlawed untouchability as a practice in 1955, giving rise to the term "ex-
Untouchable." Eleanor Zelliot, Introduction to VASANTMOON, GROWINGUP UNTOUCHABLE
IN INDIA: A DALIT AUTOBIOGRAPHY, at xi (Gail Omredt trans., 2001). After the constitution
instituted the practice of compensatory discrimination, discussed in detail infra notes
92-108 and accompanying text, the term "Scheduled Castes" came into common usage. Id.
Beginning in the 1970s, the term "Dalit" arose to refer to the ex-Untouchables, a name
meaning "downtrodden or broken down but used with pride as a self-chosen name that
reflects no idea of pollution and can include all who identify themselves as oppressed by the
caste system." Id. Those identifying themselves in this manner use this label as a break from
the hierarchical caste model's focus on pollution, but also to break away "from the patronage
of Gandhian ideology." Id. Gandhi used the term "Harijan," meaning "people of God" to
refer to ex-Untouchables. Id. at x. The term was seen as patronizing by some, probably
because of disagreement with his views on caste reform. Id. Further discussion of Gandhi's
view of the Dalit groups will be discussed infra notes 57-64 and accompanying text. For
these reasons, where possible, the ex-Untouchables will be referred to as Dalits.
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it appears that they were not part of the creator's body.24 Ghurye noted that "the
ideas of untouchability and unapproachability arose out of the ideas of ceremonial
purity, first applied to the aboriginal Shudras in connection with the sacrificial ritual
and expanded and extended to other groups because of the theoretical impurity of
certain occupations. 25 The treatment of this group of people represents the ultimate
in disparate treatment among the groups of Indian society.26
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the four idealized Hindu castes do not
reflect the true complexity of the Indian social hierarchy. Hierarchies exist in part
because of the progressive duties arising out of life stages. Moreover, operating
parallel to the four-fold caste system, regional and local differences greatly modified
this basic model. The thousands of sub-castes within each larger caste group have
been said to derive from hypogamous, or inter-caste, marriages.27 For this reason,
an understanding of the origins and role of the caste system generally does not
provide a very accurate picture of the ways in which groups identified themselves
and interacted in India either historically or today. However, the widely accepted
(though doubtful) theory that hypogamous marriages resulted in the myriad social
divisions "demonstrates the pervasiveness of an ideal order based on the assumption
that the underlying relativity of human nature should be materially expressed in
hierarchical social groups."28
B. India's History and the Effects of Colonialism
The foregoing history of Indian religion and civilization presents only one
possible understanding of the roots of Indian social stratification. Others argue that
the effects of British colonizers forever altered the world's view of India, and India's
view of itself.29 Reasons for this shift are manifold, but one key reason is the source
24 G.S. GHURYE, CASTE AND RACE IN INDIA 307 (5th ed. 1969); see also supra note 15
and accompanying text.
25 GHURYE, supra note 24, at 180.
26 The term "untouchable" accurately represents the wider societal perception of this
large group of people. "Prabu mentions that untouchability refers to denying even human
status to a group of human beings ...... SUNEILA MALIK, SOCIAL INTEGRATION OF
SCHEDULED CASTES 4 (1979) (citing P. N. Prabu, Report of the Seminar on Casteism and
Removal of Untouchability 104, Indian Conference of Social Work (1955)). The
untouchables often face treatment worse than animals. Id.
27 TYLER, supra note 13, at 84.
28 Id. Tyler notes that further evidence of this conceptualization of society is shown in
the apparent inconsistency of these theories with the reality of the world. Id. When
contradictory facts emerged to refute this theory, Hindu thinkers did not alter their model of
the world; they altered the facts. Id. The multitude of groups continued to be "attributed to
lapses in the observance of the rules of dharma." Id.
29 For an extended and comprehensive discussion of these issues, which cannot be fully
explicated here, see generally DIRKS, supra note 15.
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of historical documentation of much of India's pre-colonial past. The view of India
as adopted by Britain and the West draws from narrow sources - primarily the
Hindu "law books," which were the work of Brahman priests and early European
explorers.3 ° The early studies of Indian culture provided by the British reflect their
own Western biases, but also the biases of the Brahmans, as most early British
ethnographers only gathered information from this group and relied on their earlier
interpretations of scripture. 1 While this phenomenon provides a compelling inquiry
into the effects of colonization on culture, the difficulty of fully understanding
Indian culture became critical at the time of constitution drafting. As an indepen-
dent India sought to define itself, the years of colonization ultimately helped further
entrench Indians' essentially collectivist view of human society, and, of course, the
role of equality in that society.
Flawed accounts of Indian history likely resulted from both innocent and
nefarious reasons. Very early explorers to India did not mention caste, or did not
do so in great detail.32 Louis Dumont in Homo Hierarchicus provided one of the
first historical records of Indian history.33 Dumont asserted that "a Western
audience. . . will misunderstand caste and hierarchy, because of the modern denial
of principles that seem opposed to individualism and equality."34 That the British
seemed perplexed by Indian social structures is not entirely surprising, nor is it
surprising that they were very concerned with understanding how class operated,
considering the importance of class in nineteenth-century Britain. Prior to British
rule, the caste system functioned as only one of several ways of expressing identity.
On local levels, the influence of one group over another changed frequently. These
groups included temple communities, territorial groups, and agricultural or trading
collectives.35 The power of these groups could rise or fall with their fortunes, or
30 CYNTHIA TALBOT, PRECOLONIAL INDIA IN PRACTICE: SOCIETY, RELIGION, AND
IDENTITY IN MEDIEVAL ANDHRA 48 (2001) ("Recent research on the early colonial period
has, however, increasingly called into question the accuracy of images of 'traditional' South
Asia derived from ethnographies and brahmanical literature."). Talbot generally limits the
scope of her book to the region of Andhra, one of the least-studied areas of India, but today
it represents India's largest state. In fact, such recent scholarship represents a sharp change
from early histories, which attempted to characterize the entire subcontinent as a single
cultural and social entity, despite the incredible diversity of views and social arrangements.
31 See DmKS, supra note 15, at 19-31 (discussing the flawed historical record due to
Western and Brahmanical biases).
32 See id. at 20.
33 See Louis DuMONT, HOMO HIERACHICUS: THE CASTE SYSTEM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
(Mark Sainsburg et a]. trans., 1980). Dumont lived in India as a missionary, which presents
difficulties apart from those of elite Brahman biases or colonial perspectives.
34 DIRKS, supra note 15, at 4 (discussing Dumont's belief that the extreme individualism
of the West is a roadblock to understanding caste).
" DIRKS, supra note 15, at 11-14.
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even by royal decree.36 Faced with such a complex society, it is no wonder that
British leaders welcomed James Mill's account of Indian society.37 Mill derived his
view of caste from a British translation of The Laws of Manu (Manu Dharma
Sastras), written by Brahman priests and scholars, which focused on the topics of
varna - the social responsibilities of different castes. 38 The text's eventual position
as a canonical explication of Indian society, of course, helped to solidify a Brahman-
oriented worldview as emblematic of Indian society generally.39
Revisionist examinations of Indian culture assert that "brahman dominance
was greatly heightened by colonial practices of the nineteenth century."'  Dirks
argues that caste is not essential to Indian society, history, or tradition - contrary
to popular belief and much scholarship. He argues that British rule "ma[de] caste
the central symbol of Indian society."'" The colonizers did not create it, but under
colonial influence, it became the main, if not the only, hierarchical social system
of organization, superceding other, complex variations of traditional Indian social
relationships of identity and community.42
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the British preoccupation with caste
spread to Indians in general, as they too began to view it as a primary institution of
Indian social organization.43 Caste became central to nearly every political or social-
reform position. Part of this phenomenon was the legacy of intentional British
influence on Indian doctrine. Biased presentations of India's pre-colonial past were
not necessarily the unintentional misunderstandings of aliens to the social system.
By making caste the core institution of Indian society, the colonizers strengthened
and justified colonial rule."
During the last stages of colonization, caste was used to denounce Indian
society, "particularly when it was seen as a force impeding social equality and the
better treatment of women in Indian society."45 Further, it was denigrated for its
divisiveness and "portray[ed] ... as a barrier to the gradual unification of the Indian
36 Id. at 13.
37 Id. at 31. After Mill, a British journalist, published his book, he was offered lifetime
employment by the East India Company. His account refuted any suggestion that Indian
society represented any meritorious values, despite never visiting the country or speaking any
of its languages. Id. at 32.
38 Id. at 34.
" Id. at 34.
40 TALBOT, supra note 30, at 48.
4' DIRKS, supra note 15, at 5.
42 id.
41 Id. at 232.
44Id. at 14-15.
45 Id. at 232. The role of women in Indian society poses interesting questions in terms of
an Indian view of equality. Women did not have a prominent role in the traditional view of
Indian society, and even if they held superior positions in terms of caste, they nonetheless
were consistently inferior to men, at least men of their own caste. Id. at 72.
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people under the essentially beneficent, modernizing rule of the British." 46 As Sumit
Surkar remarked, "the social injustice argument, while not absent, remained
secondary.
47
The ultimate result of these influences is that Indians have come to view their
history as representing a hierarchical social order, in which Indians frequently
identify themselves as members of a caste group rather than individuals. 8 Suneila
Malik, in 1979, discussed a study aimed at improving social mobility among the
Dalit castes through education 9.4 The results indicated that many people identified
themselves by caste, but that the less educated a member of a Scheduled Caste was,
the more likely he was to identify himself as of a lower caste.5 0 Malik also docu-
mented findings regarding the degree of respect afforded to certain Dalits. Studies
found that while Chamar schoolteachers garner a higher degree of respect than their
Dalit caste usually affords, these individuals still gamer much less respect than
teachers of higher castes.5" As indicated by B.S. Cohn in 1955, "Education is an
individual achievement, but even educated Chamars cannot escape an awareness
that mobility for them, too, must be a group phenomenon." 52 Although one might
expect some improvement in the perception of Dalits since these studies were
published, there is evidence that identification with one's caste may have grown
even greater.5 3 Whether imposed by Brahman bias or colonial power, this self-
identification had no greater impact than on the caste-reform movements of the
twentieth century and the drafting of the Constitution of India.54
H. INDIA'S MODERN CONSTITUTION AND CASTE-REFORM MOVEMENTS
As India gained its independence from colonial rule, re-establishing Indian
society required a vision of the history of Indian society. The influences described
in the previous section helped shape that national story, resulting in much conflict
in determining how to address the inequalities of caste in the constitution. As Nehru
46 Id. at 232.
47 SuMrr SUKAR, WRITING SOCIAL HISTORY 365 (1997).
48 Dirks argues that British influences made caste the essential symbol of Indian social
organization, but he acknowledges that Indian history demonstrates that hierarchy and
rankings of social groups have played a significant role. See DIRKS, supra note 15, at 14.
49 MALIK, supra note 26, at 44-45.
'0 Id. at 45.
S1 Id. at 52.
52 Bernard S. Cohn, The Changing Status of a Depressed Caste, in VILLAGE INDIA 53,
74 (McKim Marriot ed., 1955).
" Even as Dalits gain greater levels of education and success, the rise of violence by
upper-caste Indians suggests there may have been a rise in caste consciousness among the
more privileged castes. See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
54 See MALIK, supra note 26, at 6-7.
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explained: "The conflict [of reform efforts] is between two approaches to the
problem of social organisation, which are diametrically opposed to each other: the
old Hindu conception of the group being the basic unit of organisation, and the
excessive individualism of the west, emphasizing the individual above the group. 55
The debate over how to constitutionalize equality in a caste-based system can be
broken into two camps, best represented by their leaders. These contrasting posi-
tions regarding caste and caste reform continue to define the debate to this day.56
Mahatma Gandhi argued that the inequalities faced by Dalits would be best
remedied by a "change of heart" among caste Hindus.5 7 While early on he criti-
cized the poor treatment of "Harijans" (as he called the group of ex-Untouchables),
Gandhi hesitated to condemn the use of caste as a valid social hierarchy, instead
looking for ways to improve upon the existing hierarchy.58 He wanted to reinstate
the"imagined pure state of Hindu society," composed of four distinct castes.5 9
While this ambiguous position may have meant that he proposed a society based
on current occupational talents, he likely envisioned a society based on birth.
Gandhi "subscribed to the view 'once born a Brahmin always a Brahmin.' ' 6°
Dirks notes: "[Gandhi] felt that caste as a ranked structure of groups was bad but
that the principles of vama and asrama (stage of life) on which caste was based,
and of which caste could be seen as a degraded form, were noble and well worth
reviving as ideals."'" His position on caste provided an interesting conception
of the possibility of equality among unequals. Furthermore, Gandhi's view that
caste was an integral part of Indian society and ultimately defensible, led him
55 JAWAHARLAL NEHRU, THE DISCOVERY OF INDIA 245-46 (Oxford Univ. Press 1985)
(1946).
56 The debate between Gandhi and Ambedkar is more salient than ever. While Ambedkar
was convinced that political identification with one's position would allow for social
reform, ultimately requiring conversion from Hinduism, Gandhi was very concerned that
such identification would lead to inter-caste conflict. DIRKS, supra note 15, at 277. Caste
violence is as widespread today as it has ever been; in some regions, the violence has
increased. Id. at 278.
57 Zelliot, supra note 23, at x. As previously noted, many Dalits felt Gandhi's approach
was patronizing.
58 DIRKS, supra note 15, at 233.
59 GHURYE, supra note 24, at 404-05. Ghurye argues that a return to the four-caste
division would be unwise, unworkable, and pointless. He finds no modem justification for
a reorganization in order to incorporate the Dalits or to streamline the castes back into four
manageable groups, which was essentially Gandhi's position on caste. The rationale based
on occupation appears useless, and the same problems with caste would recur if individuals'
occupations were dictated by birth, especially in light of the problems arising from inter-caste
marriages. Id. at 406.
60 Id. at 405.
61 DIRKS, supra note 15, at 268.
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to oppose further politicization of caste groups.62 As such, he strongly opposed the
more radical and generally more popular views of Dr. B.R. (Babasaheb) Ambedkar, 63
which largely shaped the view of caste in India's modem constitution.
64
Ambedkar viewed caste as an "impediment to social justice, equality,"65 and as
a social construct developed by Brahmans to further their own interests. Later,
according to his view, the legal text of Manu gave the caste system its religious
justifications.6' Ambedkar advocated for a separate electorate, in large part because
of his distrust of majoritarian politics. 67 He did not believe that majorities could
elect minority representatives who would truly further the interests of the Dalits.
For Ambedkar, to accept minority political representation would itself be a con-
cession to caste hierarchy. 68 The Communal Award of 1932 was passed in response
to Ambedkar's movement toward a separate electorate for Dalits.69 Yet, Gandhi's
fierce opposition to such a separate electorate led him to announce a fast until
death.7 ° Political pressure arising from Gandhi's fast led to the compromise of the
Poona Pact, which kept a communal electorate, but increased the number of seats
for Dalit representatives.7 1
More than a debate over politics, the debate between Gandhi and Ambedkar can
be seen as one attempting to define Indian society itself. As discussed earlier, the
62 MALIK, supra note 26, at 3. Gahdhi opposed both parties based on caste and separate
electorates focused on caste representation. Id.
63 Ambedkar was at least more popular among the Dalits. The introduction to the auto-
biography of Vasant Moon - an example of a Dalit who rose to success and influence -
characterizes Ambedkar as a "hero so important he is described as a 'wave,' and surely no
despised group has ever had such a meaningful leader as [Ambedkar] was (and is) for
awakened and ambitious Dalits." Zelliot, supra note 23, at ix. Moreover, as Dirks points out,
"[diespite continued resentment and debate on the part of some, there has been general
unanimity about the importance of constitutional provisions and guidelines concerning
reservations for scheduled castes and tribes." DIRKS, supra note 15, at 279. These reser-
vations form the core of the constitution's compensatory discrimination program, which was
proposed and included by Ambedkar. Id.
6 Ambedkar is known as the "father" of the Constitution of India. Id. at 265.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 266-67.
67 Id. at 270-71.
68 Id. at 270.
69 Id. at 269.
70 ld.
71 Id. Also resulting from the Poona Pact negotiations was a resolution outlawing
untouchability. This ended discrimination regarding Dalit use of public wells, schools, and
roads, as well as the demanding of temple entry for Dalits. Gandhi supported the temple
entry provision, but Ambedkar viewed this change in position as an attempt to include
untouchables in a system that would continue to subvert their role in society despite their
new entry into Hindu temples. At this point, Ambedkar began to grow more hostile toward
Hinduism itself. Id.
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role of Hinduism has played a very essential and influential role in Indian society.
For Gandhi, "[c]aste [had] nothing to do with religion. 72 Late in life, Ambedkar
came to believe that caste could only be eliminated by purging society of the
Brahmans. This would require a revolution in the way the holy scriptures were read,
and his argument questioned the moral basis of Hinduism itself. In fact, two months
before he died, Ambedkar converted to Buddhism despite his longstanding secu-
larism, and called on all Dalits to do the same. He realized that "as an untouch-
able, that he could neither undo nor escape the horrible embrace of Hinduism and
caste society. 73 The nuanced arguments of some, including Gandhi, that caste,
Hinduism, and Indian society were all separable constructs rang hollow to
Ambedkar, a Dalit himself.74
As its primary drafter, Ambedkar's greatest impact on the Constitution of India
was the allowance for positive, or compensatory discrimination in favor of the
Dalits. 75 In these provisions, he demonstrated his conviction that the Dalits "could
only thrive through constitutional negotiation around their status as an oppressed
and disenfranchised minority. ' 76 Indians, in accepting his influence on the draft
constitution, embraced this view.
A. India's Modem Constitution
The debate between Gandhi and Ambedkar represents the clearest sides of the
caste-reform movement. Prior to drafting the constitution, it was widely acknowl-
edged that the caste system required change, if only as a reaction to the constant
claim by the colonizers that Indian society was incompatible with modernity.77 It
should be noted that there are two kinds of possible change in the caste system.
First, there is positional mobility, which focuses on the individual's ability to
transcend caste barriers.7 ' A second kind of change - structural mobility -
subverts the heredity-based hierarchy itself, and therefore leads to structural
change.79 Although it is widely accepted that social mobility in traditional Indian
72 DIRKS, supra note 15, at 267 (quoting Mahatma Gandhi, A Vindication of Caste,
HARUIAN, July 18, 1936, reprinted in 1 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR, WRrINGS AND
SPEECHES 83 (1979)).
" DIRKS, supra note 15, at 271.
74 Id.
71 Id. at 278.
76 Id. at 265.
" Id. at 11. "Caste is a specter that continues to haunt the body politic of postcolonial
India. Whether in constitutional claims about the abolition of caste discrimination or in
political claims about the formation of the national community, it has become the subject of
national shame." Id. at 17.
71 MALiK, supra note 26, at 2.
79 id.
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society was very closed and caste-determined, this is belied by evidence of
occasional movement of an individual to a higher (or lower) caste. However, such
an individual success story would be a "positional and not structural change. 80
After achieving their independence, Indians pushed for structural change.81
The Constitution of India clearly reflects a group-oriented approach to equality.
The modem democratic constitution came into effect on January 26, 1950.8" Its
preamble pledges to secure justice, liberty, and equality and to promote fraternity.83
As one scholar has noted:
Justice is specifically described to be of three types, not only
political but economic and social as well. Equality is of not only
equal opportunity but also of status. Justice and Equality, as thus
defined, between them, cut the very roots of caste. Citizens of
India... avowed that the purpose of their political association
is to guarantee to every citizen not only equality of opportun-
ity, but absence of unequal treatment in social and economic
matters. 84
Articles 14-18 of the Constitution of India address elements under the rubric
"Fundamental Rights - Right to Equality."85  These protect individuals from
discrimination on the basis of caste. Article 14 states: "The State shall not deny
to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within
the territory of India. '86 Article 15 prohibits discrimination in the access to
public facilities, but reserves power for the government to make "any special
provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward
classes or citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes."87 The
80 Id.
" See id. at 6-7.
82 See This Day in History: Republic of India Born: January 26, 1950, http://www.his-
torychannel.com/tdih/tdih.jsp?month=10272953&day= 10272991 &cat= 10272946 (last visited
Feb. 22, 2005).
83 INDIA CONST. pmbl.
84 GHURYE, supra note 24, at 409.
85 INDIA CONST. arts. 14-18.
86 Id. at art. 14.
17 Id. at art. 15, cl.4; see also GHURYE, supra note 24, at 410. While explicitly focused
on the issue of caste in several places, the Constitution of India actually refers to class in
several ways. First, at times reference is made to "backward classes," which is defined as
"socially and educationally backward," and interpreted as referring to outcaste and low-caste
citizens. See id. at 412. This label is also used in Article 340, which addresses provisions for
educational positive discrimination. INDIA CONST. art. 340. A second manner in which lower
castes are labeled is found in Article 46, which requires the state to protect "weaker sections
of the people," and when considering this provision's context, seems to refer to the same
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practice of untouchability is prohibited under Article 17, and Article 18 abolishes
the use of titles.88
In addition to these clear fundamental rights provisions, numerous other
provisions complement the idea of equality in broad terms. Article 38 includes the
following provision: "The State shall, in particular, strive to minimise the
inequalities in income, and endeavour to eliminate inequalities in status, facilities
and opportunities, not only amongst individuals but also amongst groups of people
residing in different areas or engaged in different vocations."89 It should be noted,
however, that Article 38 appears in Part IV, Directives of State Policy. The articles
in this section are "not... enforceable by any court, but the principles therein laid
down are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country and it shall be
the duty of the State to apply these principles in making laws." 9
Article 46 also falls under this rubric in demanding protection of the "weaker
sections of the people, and, in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled
Tribes, and shall protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation."9'
Although this appears as an unenforceable state directive, more clear provisions
appear elsewhere which firmly entrench compensatory discrimination for the
Scheduled Castes. 92 Article 46 is furthered by Article 340, which provides for an
appointment of a presidential commission to investigate the conditions of the
backward classes in order to make policy recommendations. 93 Article 335 gives
additional special consideration to Scheduled Castes by reserving to them a certain
proportion of government posts - generally highly desirable, much sought-after
group as "backward classes" although there is some ambiguity. See GHURYE, supra note 24,
at 413. Finally, and most important for constitutional purposes, the so-called "Scheduled
Castes" are given special consideration in political representation and in hiring for
government positions, among other things. This term, although undefined in the constitution,
refers to Dalit groups and its scope is determined by the President, as provided in Article 341
of the constitution. See GHURYE, supra note 24, at 306.
88 INDIA CONST. arts. 17, 18.
89 Id. at art. 38, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
90 Id. at art. 37.
91 Id. at art. 46.
92 Entitled, "Part XVI: Special Provisions Relating to Certain Classes," Articles 330-42
carry out the aims of provisions related to equality. For example, the Scheduled Castes, as
categorized by the President, are given proportional representation via reserved seats in both
houses of the legislatures and in the state legislatures, but these reservations were scheduled
to cease after 1960. India Cen. Acts No. 43 (1950), The Representation of the People Act,
New Delhi, 12 May 1950. The descheduling effort has not begun. The sharp rise in violence
against scheduled castes - including murder, rape, and arson - have eliminated the driving
argument for the descheduling program - that untouchability no longer existed. INDIA
CONST. arts. 330-42. See DIRKS, supra note 15, at 280.
93 INDIA CONST. art. 340.
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positions.94 The system of reservations remains one of the most hotly debated
aspects of the general compensatory discrimination program.
The caste-reform approach of the constitution has not been uneventful. In 1990,
sixty-three students committed suicide by self-immolation and nearly 100 others
made attempts. 95 Another 100 were killed in confrontations with police at protests.
96
The cause of these demonstrations was Prime Minister V. P. Singh's long-awaited
implementation of the 1980 Mandal Commission recommendation in the early
1990s, which imposed quotas for the "backward classes" in government employ-
ment and the higher levels of education. 97 The Commission recommendation
essentially criticized the approach of equality of opportunity, asserting that "the
mere prohibition of discrimination ... [was] insufficient to remedy the profound
social effects of the caste system."98 The Report claimed: "People who start their
lives at a disadvantage rarely benefit from equality of opportunity ... Equality of
opportunity is also an asocial principle, because it ignores the many invisible and
cumulative hindrances in the way of the disadvantaged." 9 Litigation challenging
the report resulted in three months of oral argument before the Indian Supreme
Court in 1992.'1° The court approved several basic principles regarding affirmative
action implementation. 0' Additionally, it held that the reservation programs should
not be regarded as an exception to the constitutional protection of equality, but
rather as a means of accomplishing true equality. 10 2
Part of the impetus for the continued opposition to reservation programs lies in
the growing insecurity of upper-caste students regarding their future ability to
succeed."3 Many opponents of reservation policies also believe the policies are
colonial in character. The first such policies were actually developed under colonial
rule.' °4 As noted by Andrd Bdtaille, an influential writer on caste inequality:
It is true that the British policy of pitting caste against caste, and
community against community in the name of justice and
fairplay, aroused widespread resentment and hostility, but it did
not create the kind of response that has now come to the surface.
14 Id. at art. 335.
95 DIRKS, supra note 15, at 275-76.
96 Id.
97 id.
98 Clark D. Cunningham, Global Views: Affirmative Action: India's Example, C.R.J. 22,
23 (Fall 1999).
I d. (quoting the Mandal Commission Report) (alteration in original).
io See Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, 80 A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 477.
101 Id.
02 Id. at 477, 539.
103 DIRKS, supra note 15, at 276.
o Id. at 289.
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Perhaps Indians of an earlier generation could never feel towards
their alien rulers the sense of outrage that their descendants now
feel towards the leaders they have themselves freely chosen.
10 5
The persistent complexity of the caste system throughout India presents another
problem arising from the system of compensatory discrimination. In attempting to
separate out the classes that qualified as backward for ameliorative action by the
state, India faced the same problems the British colonizers did in attempting to
understand and classify the Indian castes comprehensively. The first commission
charged with categorizing eligible groups for favorable treatment produced a list
of 2,399 backward categories for advancement."°6 The problem, as for the British,
was that categories and social and political power of certain castes varies from
locality to locality, and region to region within the subcontinent. Concerted efforts
by colonial ethnographers to fit Indian society into a uniform social order did not
succeed, and these problems were compounded by great social and economic
variations within each caste group.107 Today, the government's attempt at positive
discrimination makes this task of categorization one of far greater political con-
sequence than the colonial attempt at a census.'0 8 While this focus on group
categorization may be envisioned as one of logistics, it seems also to speak directly
to the desire to organize society in collective, rather than individual, terms. The
Indian government has been presented with no easy task, yet they have persisted in
their attempts to achieve equality for the Scheduled Castes.
II. THE HISTORIC AND RELIGIOUS TRADITION OF AMERICA
The United States has followed an ideology of individualism beginning from the
founding of the nation. The influence of this belief in the power and importance of
the individual as the core political and social unit in this country has pervaded every
issue of national interest."' The uniquely American conception of individualism
1o5 Andrd B6taille, Caste and Reservations: Lessons of the South Indian Experience,
HINDU, Oct. 20, 1990.
106 DIRKS, supra note 15, at 283.
107 Id.
log Id.
109 A comprehensive treatment of this assertion would be much more extensive than that
provided here. I intend to demonstrate this assertion by a few key examples, rather than an
exhaustive history. Many factors contribute to the American focus on individualism that will
not be explored here: the immigration experience, the rise of urban life and industry, the ideal
of the family farmer, and the frontier experience, among others, have contributed to this
national dogma, and each has been explored by others in some detail. See, e.g., MICHAEL J.
PIORE, BEYOND INDIVIDUALISM 110 (1995) (describing the transformative importance of the
frontier, due to its isolation from society, marked by a struggle of each man against the natural
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provides the basis for our acceptance of capitalism, the extensive individual free-
doms we enjoy,"' our emphasis on private property rights," our religiousness as
compared to other modem, liberal societies,' 12 and our very democracy."' In fact,
the concept of the individual as the paramount social unit, and the belief in maxi-
mizing individual freedoms, in large part explain the division of the electorate into
two separate parties to this day. The absolute belief in individualism emerges as a
defining marker of the ways in which Americans perceive themselves as a nation.
At the same time, Americans also envision their nation as one embodying the
ideal of equality, but in many instances, the concept of equality conflicts with the
significance placed on the individual and his or her rights and freedoms. In contrast
to the Indian view of society, which rests in large part on a sense of an individual's
duty to others, the American view tends to speak in terms of freedoms or rights.
Naturally, such a vision of society has resulted in a much different conception of
equality in the United States - one focused on equal opportunity and increasingly
world as complementing an individualist, Lockean sense of the world). Moreover, the
implications of this view are embodied in our culture. For example, the American excessive
consumer culture can be viewed as emblematic of our views on individualism. Id. at 110.
110 See generally David Abraham, Liberty Without Equality: The Property-Rights
Connection in a "Negative Citizenship" Regime, 21 LAW&SOC. INQUIRY 1 (1996). Abraham
provides a compelling historical account that ties American ideals of liberty and individual-
ism as together shaped by (and shaping) private-property ideology and jurisprudence.
America... is a society of abundant individual freedoms but with little
collective organization, political purpose, or moral compass. America
seems a world of sovereign individuals.., in which any search for the
common good of [its citizens] is undermined. This has much to do with
America's diversity and with our negative, property-based conception
of freedom - our Bill of Rights liberties - and our relative lack of
positive, citizenship-based goals.
Id. at 2-3. Of course, most defenders of individualism would greatly oppose Abraham's
assertion that this approach is either amoral or that this approach disadvantages the common
good. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT (1975); RICHARD
POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981).
. See, e.g., Abraham, supra note 110.
12 PETER H. SCHUCK, DIVERSITY IN AMERICA: KEEPING GOVERNMENT AT A SAFE
DISTANCE 261 (2003) (citing TED G. JELEN, To SERVE GOD AND MAMMON: CHURCH-STATE
RELATIONS IN AMERICAN PoLrIcs 7, tbl. 1.1 (2000)).
11 The guiding standard of "one man, one vote," as elucidated in Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533 (1964), demonstrates the connection between individualist orientation and democ-
racy. For a discussion of the Voting Rights Act of 1964 and the implications of granting
racial classifications paramount importance for these purposes in a color-blind society, see
ANDREw KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONsTTUTION 210-24 (1992). See also Samuel
Issacharoff, The Endangered Center in American Politics, 46 WM. &MARYL. REV. 415,428
(2004) (discussing the ways in which the "one man, one vote" principle has been used, in
practice, to dilute the votes of minority groups due to gerrymandering).
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defined by the rhetoric of "personal responsibility."' 1 4 Americans, by and large,
perceive their society as classless and their law as "color-blind.""' 5 This idealistic
view shapes the public discourse, but these assumptions are challenged in moments
of stark public awareness of inequality. Such disjunction between the ideals that
have become operating assumptions and the reality of great inequality molded the
ways in which constitutional law approaches equality and the ways in which our
society attempts to redress those inequalities.
In the following section, the sources and the implications of ideology and the
resulting impact are explored. Section A investigates the role of prevailing religious
and philosophical ideals at the founding of the nation, which provides much insight
into the way our current Constitution views religion. In Section B, the historical ebb
and flow of the views toward individualism and the impact on views toward equality
are analyzed. Much of the constitutional doctrine of equality in the United States
rests not on the text of the Constitution, but on subsequent interpretations of the
document by the Supreme Court. Therefore, this Section focuses on three key
periods in which a collective view of equality - sometimes referred to as an egalitar-
ian view - has come to the fore, at least for a historical moment. These key periods
occurred during the Civil War, during the Depression and New Deal era, and during
the civil rights movement of the 1960s. This Section primarily addresses the after-
math of one of these moments - the civil rights movement - and how its legacy
of affirmative action challenges American views toward individual opportunity.
A. The Religious Foundations of America
The original colonists, as every American schoolchild should know, came to this
nation seeking greater freedom of religion. The Puritans exhibited "two of the most
enduring views of colonial America: America as a haven of religious freedom, and
America as a Christian Nation."'" 6 Yet, despite popular opinion, the religious beliefs
"' See, e.g., Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.);
Personal Responsibility, Work, and Family Promotion Act of 2003, H.R. 4, 108th Cong.
(2003); Personal Responsibility, Work, and Family Promotion Act of 2002, H.R. 4737, 107th
Cong. (2002); see also Pamela Yip, Bush: Take Responsibility for Savings; But Many
Consumers Won't Manage Their Money Well, Critics Say, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 26,
2004; Presidential Biography: President George W. Bush, The White House, at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/president/gwbbio.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2005) (describing the
President's reputation as a compassionate conservative shaping public policy "based on the
principles of limited government, personal responsibility, strong families, and local control").
115 See KuLL, supra note 113, at 1.
116 FRANK LAMBERT, THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE PLACE OF RELIGION IN AMERICA
1 (2003) (providing a historical account of the complex ways in which religious beliefs and
reforms have influenced our civil society).
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of these settlers, at least the Puritan founders of New England, did not mirror those
found in the Constitution drafted by a subsequent generation.
Although they arrived in order to establish a religious community, the colonists
had no doubts that theirs was the one true religion, and hence they often squelched
religious dissent by expulsion or violence against those who deviated from this
view." 7 The Puritans, or those Lambert terms the "Planting Fathers," as distin-
guished from the Founding Fathers, drafted a Constitution in 1639 affirming their
intent to form a Christian nation." 8 The purpose of the government they established
was "to mayntayne and presearve the liberty and purity of the gospell of our Lord
Jesus which we now professe."'" 9 They adhered to a dogma in which "an individual
could do nothing to effect his or her own salvation."'' 20 God had chosen a group of
them, "God's Elect," and unless admitted to join this group of people, a person had
no hope of salvation.' 2' Moreover, the Puritans believed their organization in the
New World was divinely ordained, and that their society must reflect God's will.
As such, they believed they were bound together in a "social covenant," under the
divine grace of God. 22 They designed their towns as "'Corporate' communities,"
in that they required some sacrifice of an individual's freedom in the interest of
community "holiness, peace, and order."'123 In business, the priority of community
over individual autonomy led them to value fairness of wages and prices over
profits; violators of this principle were brought into court for violation of the
social covenant.'24
The religious views of these early Americans would undergo radical changes
before the founding of the republic, leading to a very different constitutional regime
than one might expect given the Puritan origins of American society. These changes
included two principal religious and philosophical transformations - the Great
Awakening and the Enlightenment. Each of these changes transformed the Puritans'
community-oriented view of a just society into one focused on the individual, and
these new ideas found their expression in our Constitution. The rise of the
117 SCHUCK, supra note 112, at 261 (citing DIANA L. ECK, A NEW RELIGIOUS AMERICA:
HOW A "CHRISTIAN COUNTRY" HAS Now BECOME THE WORLD'S MOST RELIGIOUSLY
DIVERSE NATION 36-40 (2001)). Eck is a leading scholar on the religious diversity of India,
which rivals America in terms of such diversity. Id. at 417.
118 LAMBERT, supra note 116, at I (quoting FUNDAMENTAL ORDERS OF CONNECTICUT
(Jan. 14, 1639), reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 23-24 (Henry S.
Commager ed., 7th ed. 1963)).
119 Id.
120 Id. at 79.
121 Id. at 78.
122 Id. at 79.
123 Id. at 80 (citing KENNETH LOCKRIDGE, A NEW ENGLAND TOWN: THE FIRST HUNDRED
YEARS 16-17 (1970)).
124 Id. at 80-81. The view that economic exchanges should be governed by moral law, rather
than market forces, had widespread and significant support among Puritan believers. Id.
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evangelical faith, known as the Great Awakening, demonstrated a shift toward
individualism in the way Christians thought about their world and their society.
Departing from the prior emphasis on Christian society and community, the evan-
gelical preachers emphasized the primacy of an individual relationship with God.'25
The movement also challenged the established authority of existing parishes, intro-
ducing economic free-trade rationales into the religious sphere. In fact, Adam
Smith's Wealth of Nations greatly influenced the role religion ultimately played in
American society; he embraced a view of free trade in religion as fostering a stronger
religious attitude and being less dangerous to democracy than an officially establish-
ed religion.2 6 The Great Awakening resulted in a competitive market for religious
views and resulted in more emboldened parishioners all over the country.
127
The radical ideas of the Enlightenment provided another departure away from
early American society and toward one centered on the individual, and like the new
evangelical movement, adherents to this philosophy placed new reliance on the
potential for the individual to find his own truth. One of the most prominent and
influential thinkers of this era was John Locke. Locke's essentially objectivist
positions about the individual's relationship with the external world formed the basis
for the American tradition of liberalism. 128 He believed the world was viewed as
evidencing uniform truths no matter the individual perspective. 29 Those who
adopted these principles are often labeled Deists. 3° Adherants emphasized the
principles of rationality, rather than divine "revelation," and the ideal of nature over
biblical writings, as the lens through which to view God. '' Thomas Jefferson called
125 LAMBERT, supra note 116, at 145. ("While Protestants had always preached salvation
by faith alone and the priesthood of the believer, the revivals drew out the 'individualist logic
of Protestantism . . . further than ever before."') (quoting GORDON S. WOOD, THE
RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLuTION 145 (1991)) (alteration in original).
126 Id. at 9 (citing ADAM SMITH, 2 AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONs 797 (R. H. Campbell & A. S. Skinner eds., 1981)); see infra notes
134-38 and accompanying text (explaining how these ideas led to the adoption of the
Establishment Clause).
127 LAMBERT, supra note 116, at 128-29.
128 See generally James R. Beattie, Jr., Taking Liberalism and Religious Liberty Seriously:
Shifting Our Notion of Toleration from Locke to Mill, 43 CATH. LAW. 367 (2004).
129 PIORE, supra note 109, at 110. Piore describes the "national ethos" as paralleling this
Lockean view of the world and the "strong sense of individuality that seems to accompany
it." Id. Together with a relatively individualist strain of Protestant religions and "their
emphasis on the direct and unmediated relationship between the individual and God," the
combined impact of these ideas is expressed in the emphasis our nation places on the
individual. Id. This is especially interesting in light of the Hindu-based view toward truth.
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
130 English Deism: John Locke, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, at http://
www.utm.edu/research/iep/d/deismeng.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2005).
131 LAMBERT, supra note 116, at 159. A Deist may prefer to refer to the ultimate goal as
a search for truth, rather than a search for divine enlightenment.
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himself a Christian, but his beliefs were akin to secular humanism.1 32 Today, this
doctrine could be defined as elevating human reason over divine revelation, relying
on humans to resolve mankind's problems, and presenting beliefs characterized
as "ethical relativism."' 133 Many other Founding Fathers - including Benjamin
Franklin, Thomas Paine, John Adams, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and
John Jay - adhered to the principles of the Enlightenment, promulgated by such
thinkers as John Locke, Francis Bacon, and Isaac Newton. 134 These views, not those
of Puritan society, were expressed in the American Constitution.'35
Although great tensions emerged between those subscribing to Enlightenment
ideas and those involved with the evangelical Christian movement, the groups
worked together to forever alter religion in this country by their combined effort to
separate church and state.'36 Arising out of the belief of the individual - as either
the focus for salvation or as the source of spiritual truth through independent
rationality - the evangelicals 137 and those allied with secular humanist thought
pushed forward the Establishment Clause. 3 Today, the United States has a more
total separation of state and religion than other modem societies 139 and yet has a
more active religiousness than those societies. 14  The great constitutional
132 See Paul Kurtz, In Defense of Freedom of Conscience: A Cooperative Baptist/Secular
Humanist Declaration, Council for Secular Humanism, at http://www.secularhumanism.org/
library/fl/kurtz_16-1.1.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2005).
133 LAMBERT, supra note 116, at 279 (citing John Murrin, Religion and Politics inAmerica
from the First Settlements to the Civil War, in RELIGION AND AMERICAN POLrrlCS: FROM THE
COLONIAL PERIOD TO THE 1980s, at 19-43 (Mark A. Noll. ed., 1990)).
'34 Id. at 161; see also id. at 175.
"3 Id. at 161 ("[T]he United States was conceived not in an Age of Faith such as that of
the Puritan Fathers but in an Age of Reason," a period which takes its very name from
Paine's criticism of Christianity.).
136 Id. at 178-79.
13' The evangelicals likely supported the non-intervention of the state in religious affairs
for two reasons. First, as mentioned, their beliefs were in many ways against any religious
establishment as they implored the public in sermons to question church authority and find
their own relationship with God. Second, these teachings did not win the evangelicals any
favor with the leaders of established churches, and many prominent religious figures called
for government regulation of "Pedlars in Divinity." Id. at 128 (quoting BOSTON WEEKLY
NEWS-LETITER, Apr. 22, 1742).
138 U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1.
139 SCHUCK, supra note 112, at 261 (citing Peter L. Berger, Foreward to CHARLES L.
GLENN, THE AMBIGUOUS EMBRACE: GOVERNMENT AND FAITH-BASED SCHOOLS AND SOCIAL
AGENCIES, at xi (2000)). Of course, Adam Smith would argue that the Free Exercise Clause,
coupled with the prohibition on government regulation, has fostered greater competition in
the exchange of ideas to the benefit of both religion and of government. See supra note 126
and accompanying text.
'4 For more on the religious-marketplace-of-ideas theory and a discussion of how it has
worked to foster a more religious society, see ROGER FINKE & RODNEY STARK, THE
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implications of this ideological focus on the individual, so connected to these
normative views, were not at all limited to the role of religion.
B. The Individualist Constitution
The U.S. Constitution grew out of both the belief in the individual as the basic
unit orf reason and the act of civic participation. The Bill of Rights focuses almost
exclusively on individual freedoms and individual rights.'41 The Constitution as a
whole demonstrates a faith in individualism in its rigorous limitation of government.
This distrust of a government may have grown out of early Americans' experiences
with the English monarchy, but it also evidences a great respect for the individual,
which is supported by their religious and historical moment in time.
While these principles need not be incompatible with the ideal of equality, the
Framers rejected inclusion of the principle, both explicitly and implicitly. Jefferson
was unable to include his "self-evident truth" of the inherent equality of all men.
In fact, the Framers intentionally omitted this passage.'42 Certain phrases in the
Constitution's Preamble seem to invoke an ideal of equality. It speaks of
"establish[ing] justice" and "promot[ing] the general Welfare." 143 It should be
noted, too, that the emphasis on freedom and rights in the Constitution implicitly
rejects the ideals of the individual's duty or responsibility, which would better align
with a worldview based on collectivism, community, and true equality.
The ways in which individualism has been enshrined in Americans' views of
themselves and the world, in our Constitution, and in the resulting legal regime, has
CHURCHING OF AMERICA, 1776-1990: WINNERS AND LOSERS IN OUR RELIGIOUS
ECONOMY (1992).
141 See U.S. CONST. amends. I-X.
142 Even if it had been included, the Framers' concept of the rational individual was likely
limited to an image of a white, property-owning male. Not only was the institution of slavery
conspicuously absent in this foundational document for modem, liberal democracies, but
also serious discussion was given to granting the vote only to property-owning males. See
generally Robert J. Steinfeld, Property and Suffrage in the Early American Republic, 41
STAN. L. REv. 335 (1989). It was thought among many of the Framers that those men
without property did not have a sufficient stake in the operation of government to allow them
a vote. Id.
'43 U.S. CONST. pmbl. While an argument may be made that these do represent ideals of
society, this does not seem to explain how Americans have come to view their society as one
of equality. I would argue that Jefferson's inspirational words in the Declaration of
Independence actually provided the basis for this principle. His assertion, "[T]hese truths
[are] self-evident, that all men are created equal," offered at the defining American moment
of revolution from tyranny, has proven too attractive to be diminished by its glaring absence
from the Constitution. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). More
importantly, as will be discussed infra Part III.B. 1, the ideology of individualism puts forth
an ideal of equality, even if it is not explicit.
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had great implications for the movement toward greater equality since the Founding
and it continues to shape national debate. Initially, the emphasis on individual
freedom in our legal structure necessarily conflicts with the notion of social equality
at some point. One's freedom, for example, to dispose of one's property as one
would like contradicts the very idea of paying taxes to provide for the needs of the
community. While many valid arguments have been made against the evils of
strong government and its ability to levy taxes on its citizens, at some point the need
to provide for the "general welfare" will require an infringement on individual
liberty. For the most part, the perception of Americans that serving the individual
provides the greatest good for society eliminates conflict with these values, at least
in terms of the majority representation in government. However, at times of
economic or other crises, the values of individualism and equality clash head on.
As David Abraham points out: "The argument that liberty without equality is of
minimal value and a great risk comes up during nearly every period of social
upheaval."' 144 In the following sections, this Article explores the ways in which the
conflict between individualist and collectivist ideals in the interest of greater
equality has impacted the American constitutional tradition over time. In particular,
these sections focus on those times of social unrest which have led to widespread
movements toward greater equality, demonstrating that the American concept of
individualism is not static, nor immune from conflicting values simultaneously held
in American self-perceptions.
1. The Civil War
Undoubtedly the greatest moment of social unrest in U.S. history was the Civil
War. It can be viewed, as can be most social movements in our history, as a
challenge to the ideal of individualism. Several factors relevant for the purposes of
this Article led to the war itself. First, the abolitionist movement provides an
example of a collective recognition of injustice, which worked to eliminate the
ability to hold property in human beings. Throughout the Civil War, "[a] coalition
of radical Republicans, abolitionists, and free soilers (alternatively, radical
bourgeois, southern black workers, and elements of the northern working class)"
organized to achieve a shift from an entirely negative view of liberty.'45 Second, the
central competing values advanced by the Confederacy espoused the principles of
individualism. Consistent with the Enlightenment ideals of the Founding Fathers,
Southerners argued that their private property rights were an essential component
" Abraham, supra note 110, at 9 n. 24 (stating that the periods of the New Deal and the
civil rights movement are examples of times when these values collided).
45 Id. at 11. A positive view of rights would be more aligned with a collective view of
social organization because such rights would diminish the role of the individual as the
primary actor in and beneficiary of society.
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of liberty. 1 6 The South also advanced the argument of "states rights," which can be
viewed as an outgrowth of a limited government ideal, premised on the primacy of
the individual.'4 7 Third, the culmination of the War led to the 14th Amendment,
finally establishing a place for the concept of equality in the Constitution, although
this embodiment may have been less than wholehearted and still wedded to the ideal
of individualism.'4 8 While the ideal of equality for mankind and the concept of the
United States as a unified nation prevailed, it was short-lived.
Following the War, the country underwent a "counter-revolution of property' 4 9
that reinforced and strengthened the prior, prevailing view of a government based
on negative rights and property rights. In interpreting the new 14th Amendment,
the Supreme Court in the Slaughter-House Cases held that it maintained, rather
than eroded, the autonomy of the States as actors, effectively rolling back any
conception of a duty of the federal government to police the states. 5 ' Later, the
Court nullified the portion of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 that required equality in
public accommodations because it would impair the individual rights of private
property owners.'
Although many Americans believe, and much scholarship suggests, that equality
is a foundational principle of the United States, this idea is not found in the original
Constitution. In fact, the Convention "neglected to reaffirm Jefferson's paradoxical,
self-evident truth."' 5 2 The principal of equality was first constitutionalized with the
Civil War Amendments. Most importantly, the 14th Amendment provided:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
146 See id. at 10-13.
147 See id.
148 See discussion infra notes 151-53 and accompanying text. Interestingly, this time
period also produced the first provisions in the Constitution that undermined the autonomy
of the States and, in contrast with the original document, extended federal power rather than
limited it. See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII-XV.
"49 W.E.B. DuBois, BLACK RECONSTRUCnON IN AMERICA 580-636, 670-710 (S.A.
Russell Co. 1956) (1935).
"' Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 83 (1873); Abraham, supra note 110,
at 14-15.
1'1 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883).
152 KULL, supra note 113, at 7.
1325
2005]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." 3
The promise of "equal protection of the laws" forms the core of the constitutional
approach toward equality. This language provides the most individualist notion of
equality possible - the law shall not treat each individual different from the next.
Moreover, after the ratification of these amendments, the protections they ostensibly
afforded to former slaves and other black Americans began to be limited by the
Supreme Court.
Most notably, Plessy v. Ferguson'54 upheld that separate-but-equal standard
legitimizing segregation.' 55 Although historically repudiated, Justice Harlan's
dissent in Plessy continues to influence the discourse on equality. Harlan rejected
the Court's view that racial discrimination was a justifiable basis for classification
of people and behaviors, unless that discrimination was unreasonable as determined
by the Court.156 Instead, Justice Harlan proposed a bright-line rule that all classif-
ications based on race are unconstitutional.
15 7
In respect of civil rights, common to all citizens, the Constitution
of the United States does not, I think, permit any public
authority to know the race of those entitled to be protected in the
enjoyment of such rights ....
... There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and
neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. 8
Justice Harlan's opinion revived earlier arguments about the proper effect of the
14th Amendment.' 59 While never explicitly adopted, Justice Harlan's viewpoint
153 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
114 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
151 Id. at 543.
156 Id. at 555 (Harlan, J., dissenting). As Kull writes, the "rule of constitutional law, and
no other, will explain every Supreme Court decision in the area of racial discrimination from
1896 to the present." KuLL, supra note 113, at 118.
Plessy, 163 U.S. at 555 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
158 Id. at 554, 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
159 Wendell Phillips proposed, at the end of the Civil War, a nondiscrimination view of
federal protection for black Americans. His proposal would have explicitly prevented the
government from classifying people based on race, and although widely publicized, it was
rejected. KULL, supra note 113, at 3-4. The proposal was rejected in part because Southern
representatives felt more comfortable if the amendment only prevented unreasonable racial
classifications. See id.
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would reemerge late in the twentieth century when the Court faced the issue of
affirmative action, or governmental recognition of race to benefit minorities.
The extension of greater protections to disadvantaged groups during times of
crisis, only to abandon such efforts in less turbulent times, is a pattern that can be
traced at least from the time of the Civil War. Abraham notes that in spite of these
periods of minimization of individualism, negative rights, and property rights in
favor of greater social goods, the United States has never moved in this direction for
a significant period of time. 6" While the political discourse certainly focuses on this
tension in values, this situation is reflected and furthered by the law.'6 ' The
reemergence of individualism, negative rights, and property rights continued for
decades, finally reaching its zenith with Lochner v. New York. 62 Here, the Court
completely embraced the formalities of equality surrounding the freedom of contract,
completely disregarding the real social contexts of the bargaining parties. 16 3 The
worldview embraced by the Court in Lochner, adopted by the poor, immigrants,
and elites alike, held that "the breadth of property holding made the United States
a beacon."' 6
Indeed, this common individualist argument, often espoused today, advances
the idea that grave economic injustices are beneficial to both society and individuals.
In this way, distributive inequalities gain moral righteousness, which allows both
the poor and the wealthy, the white and the black, to embrace an unequal system
wholeheartedly. Of course, the argument wins such support because it embraces
the very ideals on which the nation was founded. The Great Depression proved to
be another time when the moral foundation of individualism began to rest on
160 See Abraham, supra note 110, at 2.
161 See id. at 1 (arguing that the law, together with politics and history, has influenced our
nation to the detriment of our "social state").
162 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding that the state could not impose a maximum work-week
labor standard because it would intrude on the freedom of contract between employee and
employer). At the time, the decision was consistent with other court decisions by the states.
Abraham, supra note 110, at 18 n.59. As one scholar has stated, the Court aimed to "annex
the principles of laissez-faire capitalism to the Constitution and put them beyond the reach
of state legislative power." Id. at 18 (quoting EDWARD CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE
SUPREME COURT 78 (1934)).
163 Abraham, supra note 110, at 18. Indeed, a formalistic view of equality indicates the
continued primacy of the value of freedom or individualism. As with the modem Court's
approach toward discrimination jurisprudence, discussed infra Part III.B.3.b, a focus on the
freedom of each person to bargain independently for advantageous terms is analogous to
addressing the presence or absence of intentional discrimination without addressing real and
apparent discriminatory results. Both approaches begin with the assumption that each person
holds an equal place in society, otherwise such apparent, unequal results would be morally
unacceptable.
'64 Abraham, supra note 110, at 17. This defense of serious, apparent economic inequality
has been made numerous times. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 110, at 17.
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shaky ground. To espouse the view that a just system should allow for greater
equality among its citizens would undermine the sense of America as a meritocracy,
where hard work is rewarded and anyone can achieve the highest levels of wealth
and success.
2. The New Deal and the Rise of the Social State
The economic crisis of the Great Depression led to much social unrest.
Unsurprisingly, it remains the greatest period of class-consciousness in the history
of America, likely because the promises of individualism - opportunity and
potential for great wealth gained through self-determination and hard work - had
never rung so hollow to so many. The resulting reforms of Roosevelt's New Deal,
especially the social safety net of welfare, held the promise of being permanent
changes in the best interest of society as a whole.165
Of course, the concept of welfare directly contradicted the ideology of the
individual. An individualist view, at least in its pure form, would argue that the
concept of welfare would undermine the principles of a meritocracy. The idea that
the state should provide for its indigent citizens directly conflicted with the moral
ideology of individualism. Robert Reich provides the contrasting moral argument
that emerged from the New Deal era (and the subsequent War on Poverty): "In
America work is a citizen's most fundamental economic responsibility. It is the
essence of the Protestant ethic, the criterion for being considered a 'deserving'
member of society. Once this responsibility is fulfilled, the burden shifts back to
society."'" Reich calls a person's willingness to work as implicating the "moral
core [of] American capitalism." '167 This view presents a collectivist-oriented
position, but one that is especially palatable due to its appeal to the normative
arguments underlying the belief in individualism. If an individual can work, this
moral core responds that the individual should be able to get a job, that a full-time
job should be enough to support a family, and that people should be able to advance
165 The recognition of unions as powerful, useful players in the marketplace also
provided workers greater equality at the bargaining table and protections from the political
actors. The empowerment of labor was "quite a collectivist achievement, providing a
countertendency for Americans who 'grew up in a society which stressed the ideals of
classlessness, individual initiative, and opportunity."' Abraham, supra note 110, at 22
(quoting Derek Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor Law, 84
HARV. L. REV. 1394, 1402 (1971)). Moreover, union activity was not confined to the
individualistic ideals of higher wages; in fact, unions "have historically been at least as
concerned with justice and equity in the workplace as with the level of compensation as
such." PIORE, supra note 109, at 13.
"6 Robert B. Reich, Introduction to MAKING WORK PAY: AMERICA AFTER WELFARE, at
vii (Robert Kuttner ed., 2002).
167 Id.
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further to the extent that they can by virtue of their own moral ability.'68 Reich's
view represents the ways in which the New Deal altered the American view toward
equality, and made the notion of equality of opportunity more realistic for many.
Although the social reforms of the era began to fade as President Roosevelt
focused on winning World War II,169 elements of the welfare state remain today,
albeit radically diminished in recent years. 7 ° Under President Reagan, who saw the
welfare system as stifling the poor's motivation to work and the wealthy's motiva-
tion to gain ever-greater levels of affluence, greater disparity in income was allowed
and arguably promoted. 7 ' Reagan's administration shifted the country's ideological
focus, which had remained fairly collectivist since the New Deal and the subsequent
civil rights movement, toward greater emphasis on individualist principles.'72
The appeal of these principles, emphasizing one's personal responsibility for
overcoming economic hardships, demonstrates the persistence of these values in the
minds of Americans. The identification with individualist principles, some claim,
explains why mothers on welfare began to blame themselves for their own poverty
and why union workers began to feel guilty when jobs were lost, in the face of
evidence that the jobs would have been lost with or without union efforts. " Studies
have demonstrated that America believes itself to be basically without class
hierarchy and as a land of equal opportunity.' This is in spite of the fact that
Americans enjoy "the most unfair distribution of wealth and income of any major
nation. The richest 1% of the population now owns as much wealth as the bottom
95% of all Americans combined."' 7 5 The apparent explanation of this disjunction
is that, in viewing equality as synonymous with opportunity, and therefore con-
cerning oneself with an evaluation of an individual's ability to succeed, Americans
are willing to overlook demonstrated inequalities.
168 Id. at ix.
169 Abraham, supra note 110, at 22. See generally ALAN BRINKLEY, THE ENDOFREFORM:
NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN RECESSION AND WAR (1995).
170 id.
'' PIORE, supra note 109, at 10.
172 See id. (describing the effects of Reagan's policies on the poor and their resulting
social manifestations).
17 Id. at 32.
17' BELL HOOKS, WHERE WE STAND: CLASS MATrERS, at vii (2000) ("As a nation we are
afraid to have a dialogue about class even though the ever-widening gap between the rich and
the poor has already set the stage for ongoing and sustained class warfare."); SAMUEL LErrER
& WILLIAM M. LE1TER, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND PoLIcy:
AN OVERVIEW AND SYNTHESIS 235-36 (Robert J. Spitzer ed., 2002); see also discussion
infra Part III.B.3 (discussing the pervasiveness and widespread acceptance of the rhetoric of
individualism).
175 LE1rER & LErrER, supra note 174, at 235-36 (quoting Congressman Bemie Sanders,
Falling Behind the Boom Times, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 12, 2000, at A15).
1329
2005]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
3. Affirmative Action, the Push Toward Equal Results, and Individualist
Backlash
The formalistic conception of equality as an individual right has been used to
help remedy overt discrimination against certain groups. Yet, this approach toward
equality has actually frustrated the achievement of greater substantive equality.
The debate surrounding affirmative action provides the greatest example of this
phenomenon. The affirmative action programs of the mid- to late-twentieth century
demonstrated a shift from the original goal of civil rights reformers to remedy
intentional discrimination. Affirmative action, instead, focuses on effects of dis-
crimination on particular groups, and, as critics contend, has resulted in an approach
that is "antimeritocratic."' 7 6 Despite the elimination of segregation during the civil
rights era, great disparities between white and black Americans persisted and the
promise of equality seemed increasingly hollow. The next logical step for achieving
greater equality was to look toward remedying those disparate effects. This section
addresses the ways in which this project failed, largely due to the American belief
in equal opportunity for the individual regardless of race. While a national ideology
stressing individual merit and opportunity is quite laudable, this system of beliefs
has worked to prevent a move toward greater substantive equality.
a. The emergence of the principal of substantive equality
By the mid-1960s, civil rights activists began not to attack formal inequality
under the law, as represented by Jim Crow laws, but instead real inequalities facing
black Americans. As Bayard Rustin wrote in 1965, there were more blacks facing
unemployment and attending segregated schools in 1964 than when Brown v. Board
of Education was decided a decade earlier. 177 Also in 1965, an extensive study at
the Labor Department revealed startling findings on the American progression
toward greater equality. A young Assistant Secretary at the Labor Department,
Daniel Patrick Moynihan, directly addressed the need to work toward equality of
176 See id. at 2.
1' Bayard Rustin, From Protest to Politics: The Future of the Civil Rights Movement, 39
COMMENTARY 25, 25-27 (Feb. 1965). Rustin directed attention to the resentment within the
black community, and noted that the struggle "after all, is not civil rights, strictly speaking,
but social and economic conditions." Moreover, he advocated a shift in focus toward "not
merely.... removing the barriers to full opportunity but.., achieving the fact of equality."
Id. at 26-27.
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results rather than equality of opportunity.178 The Moynihan Report marked a sharp
shift from the discourse of the civil rights era struggle for equality.
The ideal of equality does not ordain that all persons end up,
as well as start out equal. . . . But the evolution of American
politics, with the distinct persistence of ethnic and religious
groups, has added a profoundly significant new dimension to
that egalitarian ideal. It is increasingly demanded that the dis-
tribution of success and failure within one group be roughly
comparable to that within other groups. It is not enough that all
individuals start out on even terms, if the members of one group
almost invariably end up well to the fore, and those of another
far to the rear.'79
The Moynihan Report provided the foundation for affirmative action programs,
although the Report's author would likely not have foreseen the effect of his
findings. Moynihan advocated a comprehensive program, aimed at full employ-
ment, eradication of ghetto conditions, and structural reform of public education.
As Rustin noted, this would require a "multi-billion dollar federal public works
program."' ° In essence, the Report recommended attacking the roots of pervasive
inequality since the formal legal barriers to full opportunity had been largely
eliminated. While the goals were presented as racially neutral, the focus of
remedies was on the problems of the black urban poor.' 8' Perhaps most remarkable
is the reception the Report received in the political community. While often con-
demned,8 2 the Report led to President Johnson's famous commencement speech at
Howard University in June 1965. Johnson said: "You do not take a person who, for
years, has been hobbled by chains and liberate him, bring him up to the starting line
of a race and then say, 'you are free to compete with all the others,' and still justly
believe that you have been completely fair."'8 3  Johnson's statement remains
178 KULL, supra note 113, at 184 (citing OFFICE OF POL'Y PLAN. & RES., U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION (1965) [hereinafter
MOYNIHAN REPORT]. For more on the creation of this Report and the public and scholarly
reaction, see LEE RAINWATER & WILLIAM L. YANCEY, THE MOYNIHAN REPORT AND THE
POLrrTCs OF CONTROVERSY (1967).
179 MOYNIHAN REPORT, supra note 178, reprinted in RAINWATER & YANCEY, supra note
178, at 3.
180 Rustin, supra note 177, at 28.
181 See KULL, supra note 113, at 181. Even if the Report was directed at ameliorating the
root causes of poverty itself, it would have been a great departure from traditional American
views toward class and equality.
182 Id. at 188.
183 id. at 186-87.
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remarkably accurate in its characterization of the effects of an individualist-oriented
view of equal opportunity, especially where substantive equality of opportunity
continues to be outside the limits of mainstream debate. Johnson's attempt to
reshape the aims of equality beyond mere formalism created the basis of modem
affirmative action programs."4
After President Johnson's speech and its signal that greater social programs
furthering equality might be forthcoming, the Watts riots and the escalation of the
Vietnam conflict quickly consigned the Report recommendations to practical
irrelevance.' 85 The Report's author had assumed vast amounts of money and time
to address the causes of inequality. Now, it seemed a quick fix was needed, with
little money and time to address the complex issues raised by its findings. l 6 The
aftermath of this culmination of events began in 1968.187 Without a political
mandate, the difficulties of addressing inequalities in results were left to courts and
administrators, as they were less politically accountable, and had some options
available to them without collecting actual funds. 8 Where massive job creation had
been one of the main recommendations of the Moynihan Report, the constraints on
judges and civil rights agencies led to the only available option: they broadly
interpreted the laws against discrimination and began using racial preferences in
allocating jobs already in existence. 189 The remaining affirmative action programs
currently in place are remnants of this project.
b. Affirmative action attacked
The laudable goals of substantive equality have been nearly eliminated by the
Supreme Court as well. As noted earlier, the civil rights reforms of the 1960s
presented one of the highlights in American history where the paradigmatic goal of
individualism gave way, to some extent, to the ideals of greater collective equality.
The Court's subsequent retreat from the principles of racial equality represented in
Brown finds clearest expression in its decisions addressing affirmative action, as well
as those cases arguing that the clear effects of discrimination - not only discrim-
inatory intent - should be addressed under the constitutional guarantee of equality.
In several cases, the Court has been presented with overwhelming evidence of
unequal results among races and has denied that the situation rises to the level of an
infringement of constitutional rights.'90 Perhaps most notably, the Court addressed
184 Id.
"' Id. at 188.
186 id.
187 Id.
188 See id. at 188-89.
i89 Id. at 189.
'90 For example, the Court has struggled with the constitutionality of affirmative action
in government-funded schools. See infra notes 194-203 and surrounding text.
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the use of preferences in granting city contracts to minority-owned businesses.'
In Richmond, Virginia, the former capital of the Confederate South, a city with a
fifty percent black population, less than one percent of city contracts had been
granted to minority-owned businesses.' 92 As a result, the city created a set-aside
program reserving thirty percent of contracts for minority-owned businesses to
ameliorate this disparity. The record was replete with evidence of the city's long-
standing history of racism and oppression toward blacks. The Court did not hold
that thirty percent was too great a set-aside, but that there was no evidence that white
firms would not hire minority subcontractors and therefore there was "no proof of
discrimination."' 93 As shown in this example, the formalistic use of the 14th
Amendment's protections of equality has been used by the Court to undermine the
very project of equality.
If affirmative action - or a judicial recognition of unequal results - could be
justified in any situation, it would appear to be in the case of education. After all,
the promise of equality of opportunity seems especially false as very poor (and often
minority) children attend miserably failing schools, while students in the next, more
economically prosperous district are provided every educational advantage.
However, the Court has not been more likely to pursue greater substantive equality
in education than in other areas, despite the precedent established in Brown recog-
nizing that the formality of separate but equal masked true inequality. 4 In
particular, in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 95 the Court
addressed the great disparity in schools, largely resulting from the district's use of
property taxes as a revenue base.' 96 The Court denied that a fundamental right
was implicated, as there is no fundamental right to publicly funded education.
197
The Court also declined to recognize the poor as a suspect class under the 14th
Amendment.9 8 Furthermore, as Justice Powell noted, it was unclear any harm was
suffered, for there was no proof that less funding would result in a lower-quality
school or education. 99 The recent decision in Grutter v. Bollinger2°° reluctantly
authorized some continued use of affirmative action in admissions for higher
' City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
192 Id.
19' Patricia Williams, The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay on Formal Equality, 87
MICH. L. REv. 2128, 2130 (1989). Williams's article provides a compelling criticism of the
rhetorical devices the Court uses in Croson, 488 U.S. 469, to minimize the experience of
discrimination victims.
194 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
'1 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
196 Id. at 8.
1 Id. at 37.
198 Id. at 28.
'99 Id. at 42-43.
200 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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education.2 °' Interestingly, the decision was not based on the grounds of achieving
greater equality, but largely because of the university's goal of diversity. 0 2 That is,
the affirmative action program furthered the goals of all students to have a better
educational environment; the benefits to black and other minority students were
almost beside the point.2 3
The Court's approach to these issues has largely tracked public opinion.
Increasingly, the political will for programs to help black Americans, like programs
to help the poor, has evaporated. Moreover, no matter how sympathetic one's view
toward affirmative action, the program has largely failed.2 4 The ultimate attempts
by courts and administrators to achieve greater substantive equality have only
achieved benefits for the most qualified individuals among those in the chronically
disadvantaged group. Proponents have lost the "unifying power and the moral claim
associated" with the antidiscrimination principal; the nation has "lost sight of the
crisis it originally set out to confront." 205 As implemented, these programs have
only exacerbated the problems of poor urban blacks; not only do they have fewer
opportunities to succeed, many Americans now view them as failing despite all of
the perceived benefits they receive from affirmative action. These reasons, among
others, demonstrate the difficulty defenders of substantive equality have had in
resisting compelling ideological claims, largely from conservatives, that affirmative
201 Id. at 343.
202 Id.
203 See, e.g., Juan F. Perea, Buscando Am6rica: Why Integration and Equal Protection
Fail to Protect Latinos, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1453-54 (2004); see also Derrick Bell, Jr.,
Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARv. L. REV. 518
(1980). Bell, a leading critical-race theorist, explains the Brown decision as largely con-
servative and motivated by desires to gain greater credibility in the ideological struggle of
the Cold War, to give black Americans hope that the ideals of freedom trumpeted during
World War II might eventually include them, and to push the South toward greater economic
success, which had been hampered by segregationist policies. Id. at 524-25. He also argues
that gains in greater equality for blacks have only been achieved when such reforms are in
the interest of the white majority. Id. at 524. He calls this "interest-convergence theory" and
has elaborated on this theory in many publications. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE
NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 102-22 (1987); DERRICK BELL,
FACES AT THE BoTroM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 47-64 (1992).
204 For a discussion of the problems affirmative action programs face, see generally
DARIEN A. MCWHIRTER, THE END OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1996).
20" KULL, supra note 113, at 190; see also STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN
AFFIRMATrIvE ACTION BABY (1991). Carter notes that the results of affirmative action
programs have meant middle-class blacks are better off, but lower-class blacks are actually
worse off. Id. at 71. While this may not be the cause of the growing income gap within the
black community, it certainly will not solve it. Id. at 71-72. Carter's book also provides an
insightful and personal discussion of the difficulties of identifying oneself as black and also
supporting affirmative action programs, despite strong feelings of individualism and the
desire to claim ownership for one's individual accomplishments. Id. at 71-123.
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action is contrary to America's central focus on the individual, either in economic
terms, or in terms of equal opportunity among job applicants. Indeed, perhaps the
greatest detriment of affirmative action programs lies in the expenditure of "limited
political capital available for 'programs to help blacks' on measures that do little or
nothing to improve the condition of those black Americans."'"
The current public and legal debate over the value, and even the legitimacy, of
affirmative action highlights the sensitivity and ambivalence Americans feel toward
any program that undermines the ideals of this nation, including equality among
individuals, merit, and nondiscrimination. As Peter Schuck writes, the unpopularity
of affirmative action today lies in its "reinforcement of the pernicious and in-
creasingly meaningless use of race as a central principle of distributive justice rather
than other distributive principles, particularly merit, with which most Americans,
whites and minorities alike, strongly identify."20 7 Affirmative action programs
provoke such resentment precisely because they are only justifiable if one recog-
nizes that inequality exists, which most Americans are reluctant to acknowledge." 8
At the least, one must maintain that poverty can be overcome if one merits better
social and economic standing. Second, these policies were implemented in a half-
hearted manner. Even the reforms proposed by the Moynihan Report would have
been widely opposed because they would have resulted in higher taxes, which
many view as an infringement of individual property rights and an unjust redis-
tribution to those who have proven incapable of improving their own conditions.
However, the failure to implement the Report's changes has resulted in even greater
opposition precisely because they favor minority groups in a zero-sum allocation of
jobs and resources.
Few minorities have directly benefitted from these policies, and the compar-
atively greater opportunity afforded to white Americans and wealthy individuals has
remained unchanged, but the very existence of such programs has led to hostility by
those who feel they have been harmed by "reverse racism. ' '209
206 KULL, supra note 113, at 221.
207 SCHUCK, supra note 112, at 135.
208 Many have argued that whites dislike affirmative action policies because they put
white people on the defensive. Furthermore, many have argued that the dislike also stems
from the policies' ability to undermine the ideals of individualism and meritocracy that, if
questioned, could pose many more difficulties in Americans' self-perception. As one author
noted, because affirmative action policies require one to quantify the numbers of each racial
group to have achieved certain successes, "affirmative action programs strip legitimacy from
the assumption that the current distribution of access, wealth, and work is a natural
phenomenon. The predominance of white people in a medical school class, secretarial pool,
lunchroom, or office party loses that natural status which required no justification." Martha
R. Mahoney, Class and Status in American Law: Race, Interest, and the Anti-Transformation
Class, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 799, 811 (2003) (citations omitted).
209 As one politician explained: "I don't think there are 500 people in Louisiana that have
either been adversely affected or benefited from affirmative action. But everyone who
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c. The lost goal of substantive equality and its effect on lived reality
In discussing the formation of radical American individualism, this Article has
made some generalizations about the pervasiveness of this principle in the hearts and
minds of Americans. While the rhetoric often presents broad principles of policy
when invoked by politicians, the effect of these principles is personally felt. In fact,
the strength of the ideology of individualism has become clearer in the past two
decades, as the reforms that aimed at collective equality have been increasingly
limited. For example, the views of black children in an inner-city school demon-
strate the pervasiveness of these ideals. Social scientists investigating the future of
civic participation among certain groups visited Baltimore public schools and met
with many students on several occasions.21 The children generally attended seg-
regated schools and lived in racially homogenous communities."' Most tellingly,
the students were "amazed" to see white people (the researchers) because they
seldom saw white people other than police officers. Indeed, many students assumed
the researchers were basketball recruiters.212
Despite these experiences, the black students expressed the view that racism
and discrimination occurred "a very long time ago." '213 Each of them could recount
horrific stories about murders and police brutality, without any broader compre-
hension of the possible forces at work in their community - chronic poverty, crime,
discrimination, and drugs. As the researchers noted, "we found little confidence
among the black adolescents in our study that collective action was at all relevant
to their efforts to get ahead. Many African Americans coming of age in the new
century view the civil rights movement as ancient history." '214 Indeed, the students
did not direct anger about their social situation at discrimination but rather toward
each other. A discussion about the merits of welfare at Dunbar High School in
Baltimore's inner city led a female student to argue that the government should not
be focusing on getting women to work, but that welfare reform should begin with
getting the men to work.2' 5 A male student responded, "Just close your legs, that
doesn't have a job or whose son cannot get into law school believes it's because of
affirmative action." Edwin Edwards, Remarks During His Gubernatorial Campaign Against
Former Ku Klux Klan Leader David Duke (1991), quoted in MICHAEL GOLDFIELD, THE
COLOR OF POLITICs: RACE AND MAINSPRINGS OF AMERICAN POLITICS 7 (1997).
210 JAMES G. GIMPEL ET. AL., CULTIVATING DEMOCRACY: CivIc ENVIRONMENTS AND
PoLmCAL ASSOCIATION IN AMERICA (2003). In studies within diverse public schools, the
authors document the ways in which one's social and economic status, culture, and environ-
ment impact one's political efficacy. Id.
211 id.
212 id.
213 Id. at 70.
214 id. at 69.
215 Id. at 70.
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would solve the problem. 2 '6 Equal opportunity and self-reliance, as seen in this
example, often result in blaming the victim. The researchers noted further: "Again
and again we found that these kids had come to believe in the American individ-
ualist creed, that success is really up to them, and that poverty and other social
problems stem from a lack of motivation rather than structural inequalities or
discrimination. 217
CONCLUSION
India and the United States share many similarities, suggesting that their
systems are actually not so different, although their ideological views toward
individual rights and substantive equality have resulted in very different consti-
tutional regimes. "India has developed a legal system that is probably more similar
to that of the United States than any other country, particularly in the field of
constitutional law." 218 Both constitutions guarantee similar individual rights, both
boast of constitutional courts with great powers of judicial review, including the
ability to strike down legislation, and both share the common tradition of the British
common law.219 However, the Indian approach toward affirmative action, as an
example of a project to further equality, focuses on eliminating the continued effects
of social hierarchy that have perpetuated the inferior socioeconomic status of certain
groups. 220 The difference between these views toward equality can be explained by
the focus either on the individual or on groups and the benefits individuals receive
based on their position in society's hierarchy. President Johnson's recognition of
the actual conditions of inequality2" - both the lived realities of individuals and the
persistence of inequality among societal groups - would have presented a paradigm
shift in the American civic religion. In contrast, such recognition of collective dis-
advantage guides India's approach to achieving greater equality. The comparison
of these two approaches toward equality provides some interesting lessons.
First, the absolute furtherance of either of these approaches to equality would
not be advisable. A purely collectivist, results-oriented push for substantive equality
finds its clearest expression in the rhetoric of Marxism, which, in practice, denies
the inherently unequal qualities of individuals, undermines individual liberty, and
even proves ineffective at eliminating true inequalities. India's system recognizes
the value of achieving substantive equality while also protecting individual free-
doms and rights. An entirely individualist approach toward equality of opportunity
216 Id.
217 Id. at 69.
218 Cunningham, supra note 98, at 22.
219 id.
220 id.
221 See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
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can be found in early America and, to some extent, this formalistic approach
persists to this day. It denies that there are very different opportunities available to
those born within an existing social hierarchy, and justifies existing inequalities by
referencing the formal equality of every individual under the law.
Second, each of these approaches result in very different legal principles,
which can be summarized as an effects-based inquiry into achieving equality on
one hand or a formalistic goal of ensuring antidiscrimination on the other. Each of
these standards has its own drawbacks. Primarily concerned with the effects of
past discrimination and continuing socioeconomic stratification of castes, the
Indian approach, at least in theory, focuses on achieving the ideal of a society free
of undeserved inequality. However, the resentment that such programs of the Indian
approach have generated reflects the shared principles of individual rights and merit
that have prevented adoption of such programs in the United States. The protests of
the upper classes in India reflect the despair among their young people that they
are themselves disadvantaged, with some feeling a distinct lack of opportunity.
Whether their perceptions reflect an accurate view is debatable, but the conflict-
ing ideals nevertheless present Indian leaders and voters with a difficult balancing
of interests.
Moreover, the argument that antidiscrimination alone will eliminate continued
caste discrimination has not evaporated. Ghandi's concern that an attempt to give
secured political rights to the lower castes would result in greater entrenchment of
the caste system may prove true. The more practical approach of Dr. Ambedkar -
to grant the lower castes and outcastes political power regardless of continued
discrimination by upper-caste Hindus - does have the advantage of at least
achieving practical results. The Indian approach lacks the idealistic moral authority
of achieving a unified society where caste, class, and race are no longer contem-
plated; however, concrete steps to elevate groups' societal standings provide an
ability to measure and achieve some progress, rather than waiting for elimination of
racism or for each individual of a maligned group to pull him- or herself out of
poverty by sheer fortitude and determination. A further problem encountered with
an effects-based inquiry arises in the context of defining disadvantaged groups and
weighing their relative barriers to full equality. In India, caste has become the domi-
nant concern for social reform, but women and certain races face very different
obstacles, and they too have similar histories of social and economic discrimination.
The U.S. Supreme Court has expressed alarm over this precise problem as a means
of justifying their refusal to look at unequal effects.222
222 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). The Supreme Court held:
To accept Richmond's claim that past societal discrimination alone can
serve as the basis for rigid racial preferences would be to open the door
to competing claims for "remedial relief' for every disadvantaged
group. The dream of a Nation of equal citizens in a society where race
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An approach concerned solely, or even primarily, with preventing overt,
invidious discrimination does not achieve equality of results, as can be seen from the
American experiment in achieving racial equality since World War II. In fact, once
the U.S. Supreme Court began to give the 14th Amendment's guarantee of equality
under the law some teeth, perhaps beginning with Brown, the principle quickly
began to operate to prevent the achievement of greater equality, as seen in the
history of affirmative action programs. The same pattern can be seen with the
legislative reforms toward equality of the New Deal era, such as welfare programs
and labor laws; these have largely been eroded by arguments that they impair
individual liberty and responsibility.
A legal approach focused on eliminating unequal effects among society's groups
ensures, to a much greater extent, the ability of individuals to achieve equal success.
After all, it is unlikely that wealthy white individuals control nearly all of the
nation's capital due to their inherent, superior talents. That these groups have not
suffered from centuries of discrimination and other hardship provides a much more
likely explanation for this class stratification. Their control over the social capital
in society provides another explanation (i.e., those whose forbears amassed fortunes
in a time of explicit exploitation of others remain much more likely today to retain
those advantages and continue to accumulate them). Essentially, to protect the
rights of the individual to such a great extent merely entrenches those already among
the elite. Collectivist programs aimed at alleviating inequality also proceed from the
assumption that the law provides a tool for achieving social change, whereas
formalist equality-of-opportunity approaches proceed from the assumption that the
legal system is limited in its ability to influence social structures.
Third, each of these legal approaches has political ramifications. India's
society, shaped by the values of social responsibility, together with the values of
liberalism and individual rights, demonstrates an acknowledgement of existing
injustices and has coupled this awareness with concrete steps to ameliorate them.
In contrast, the United States has already achieved equality of opportunity under the
law, at least in terms of formal equality. As such, the push toward ever-greater
equality, envisioned during the civil rights era, has largely stalled. Disenchanted
with social programs that seem to have failed, mainstream America has largely
given up on the project, content to explain the continued gulf between the rich and
the poor, whites and blacks, as a natural consequence that cannot be affected by
government intervention. More accurately, most likely feel that these disparities can
only be prevented through programs that undermine the ideological rhetoric of
is irrelevant to personal opportunity and achievement would be lost in
a mosaic of shifting preferences based on inherently immeasurable
claims of past wrongs.
Id. at 505-06 (1989). But see Williams, supra note 193, at 2128-29 (criticizing the Court's
argument in Croson as disingenuous and unfounded).
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untempered individualism, private property, and capitalism that has been ingrained
in the national psyche since before the drafting of the Constitution. Subsequently,
the entrenchment of these ideals in our constitutional system has strengthened them
to the extent that most Americans view them as part of the national order, having
achieved the status of moral imperatives. Thus, as India continues to attempt greater
equality, even though it will very likely never result in an absolute equality based
on merit, the United States retreats to its default position of radical individualism
and utilizes less overtly racist and elitist rhetoric to justify the country's conditions.
This Article analyses the more collectivist principles of true equality and the
more individualist principles of liberty as if they are diametrically opposed. To
some extent, they must conflict. The incompatibility of these principles is demon-
strated in the discussion of the opposition of Enlightenment ideals to concepts like
welfare reform and affirmative action. This conflict is also evidenced in the tradi-
tional Hindu view of the individual as opposed to the benefit of society. Yet, the
principles of individualism need only conflict with the ideal of equality when one
embraces an absolutist or radical view of either of these ideals. In fact, the radical
view of egalitarianism as expressed in Marxist thought is justified, in part, on the
idea that man cannot be free as long as he is bound to an unequal society and
unable to exploit fully his own natural talents without regard for the need to
compete against others. Although liberty and equality can be opposed to each other,
a balanced view of either ideal and furtherance of both laudable goals requires some
elements of each.
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